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Abstract 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, one of the 
core capabilities for USN need to be studied, particularly in these times of budget 
cuts, realignment of forces, and restructuring of the Services. We study selected 
past disasters to organize their costs and propose future studies that can provide 
operational and financial policy recommendations that will induce efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
Keywords: HADR, USN, cost 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - ii - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - iii - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank RADM James Greene and Prof. Keith Snider for their 
support and guidance through the Acquisition Research Program. We would like to 
thank our students from USN, who are an inspiration to us, Cullen M. Greenfield, 
Cameron A. Ingram, Stephen A. Ures, Dana M. Herbert,  James A. Prosser, 
Rachele A. Wharton, Alexander Kaczur, Jayson Aurelio, Edelio Joloya, and David 
Moffat. We would also like to thank Karey Shafer for her help.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - iv - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - v - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
About the Authors 
Dr. Aruna Apte is an associate professor in the Operations and Logistics 
Management Department of the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Aruna has successfully completed 
various research projects, involving applications of mathematical models and 
optimization techniques that have led to over 20 peer-reviewed journal articles, over 
40 research articles, and one patent. Her research interests are in developing 
mathematical models for complex, real-world operational problems using 
optimization tools. She values that her research be applicable. Currently her 
research is focused in humanitarian and military logistics. She has several 
publications in journals, such as Interfaces, Naval Research Logistics, Production 
and Operations Management, Decision Sciences Journal. She has also published a 
monograph on Humanitarian Logistics. 
Aruna received her PhD in Operations Research from Southern Methodist 
University in Dallas. She also has a M. A. in Mathematics, from Temple University, 
Philadelphia. Before NPS she worked as a consultant at MCI and taught at the Cox 
School of Business, SMU, where she won the best teacher award. She has over 
twenty years of experience teaching operations management, operations research, 
and mathematics courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. At NPS She 
teaches mathematical modeling, for which she won the best teacher awards (Liskin 
and Hamming) and has advised over 99 students for 46 MBA/Masters reports.  She 
has also advised emergency planners in preparing for disaster response. She is the 
founding and past president for a college (focus group) in Humanitarian Operations 
and Crisis Management under the flagship of academic professional society in her 
intellectual area of study, Production and Operations Management Society. 
Dr. Aruna Apte 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
Tel: (831) 656-7583 
Fax: (831) 656-3407 
E-mail: auapte@nps.edu 
Dr. Keenan Yoho’s primary research activities are in the area of analysis of 
alternatives for capital purchases under conditions of resource scarcity, supply chain 
management, risk analysis, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and 
resource management in environments that exhibit high degrees of uncertainty. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - vi - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Prior to joining the Naval Postgraduate School, Yoho was an operations 
researcher and principal investigator with The RAND Corporation, a federally funded 
research and development center (FFRDC), where he led studies for the Army, Air 
Force, and TRANSCOM to improve the effectiveness of logistics, acquisition, and 
sustainment operations and to develop policy guidance for supply chain operations. 
Yoho has several years of experience teaching and developing master’s 
students and executives in the U.S. and Europe in principles of supply chain 
management and manufacturing operations. He has served as an intelligence 
analyst for the U.S. Customs Service in the area of international money laundering 
and has worked large litigation cases representing Lloyd’s of London in insurance 
defense. He was the National Research Coordinator for Manufacturing Skills 
Standards as part of an initiative funded by the United States Congress to develop 
national skill standards for the U.S. industrial manufacturing economic sector. He 
has advised U.S. and European firms for several years in the petrochemical, 
semiconductor, paper and pulp products, and steel industries, focusing on enabling 
corporate strategy by using the supply chain as a competitive weapon. 
Yoho holds a PhD in operations management, an MBA in operations and 
information management, and an MS in industrial relations from the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. He also holds a BA in religion with a concentration in Chinese 
and Japanese Buddhism from Temple University. 
Dr. Keenan D. Yoho 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
Tel: (831) 656-2029 
Fax: (831) 656-3407 
E-mail: kdyoho@nps.edu 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - vii - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
NPS-LM-15-123 
Acquisition Research Program 
Sponsored Report Series 
United States Navy Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
(HADR) Costs: A Preliminary Study 
26 August 2015 
Aruna Apte, Associate Professor 
Keenan D. Yoho, Assistant Professor 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - viii - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - ix - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 
The Disasters and the Costs ...................................................................................... 2 
Conclusion and Future Research............................................................................. 12 
References .............................................................................................................. 14 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - x - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xi - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Cash Flow Process of DoD for Humanitarian Operations ................ 4 
Figure 2. The USNS Mercy and USS Abraham Lincoln Arrive on Station Near 
Banda Aceh, Sumatra, in 2004 ........................................................ 6 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xii - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xiii - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Cases Considered in the Key Literature for USN HADR Costs ........ 3 
Table 2. Summary of the Three Disasters ...................................................... 5 
Table 3. Cost for Ships and Their Platforms for the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami ........................................................................................... 7 
Table 4. USN-Reported Incremental Costs Associated With the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami Operations off the Coast of Sumatra ...................... 8 
Table 5. Cost for Ships and Their Platforms for 2010 Haiti Earthquake ......... 9 
Table 6. USN-Reported Incremental Costs Associated With the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake Operations .................................................................... 9 
Table 7. Cost for Ships and Their Platforms for 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami in Japan ........................................................................... 11 
Table 8. USN-Reported Incremental Costs Associated With the 2011 Tōhoku 
Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan ................................................. 11 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - xiv - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 1 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
United States Navy Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) 
Costs: A Preliminary Study 
Introduction 
The United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD) does not set aside 
funds for disasters. The obligation of such funds is dependent on the actual 
occurrence of the event. However, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
(HADR) operations are now deemed as one of the core capabilities for the U.S. 
Navy (USN), as described in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 
and a key national strategic priority in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and 2015 National Security Strategy. 
The U.S. DoD is increasingly involved in HADR missions. However, little is 
known about the financial implications associated with specific HADR operational 
activities. In order to more effectively manage resources, and provide decision-
makers with a sense of how specific operational activities drive costs, more needs to 
be understood about recent HADR events.  
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and 2011 Tōhoku 
earthquake are just three instances when the USN has been a significant relief 
provider following a disaster. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 2010 Haiti 
earthquake resulted in widespread death, destruction, and displacement of 
thousands of persons. The Tōhoku earthquake of 2011 in Japan was a complex 
crisis event that began with a 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a tsunami and 
catastrophic compromise to the integrity of a nuclear power generation facility. 
These events are extremely important for understanding the breadth of operations 
that could take place during HADR operations, as well as the magnitude of the costs 
associated with those operations. The USN has shown time and time again that 
when there are complex and overwhelming disasters, it is capable of responding 
with unique assets and capabilities of vertical lift, personnel with specialized skills 
(such as nuclear power, medicine, logistics, and engineering), and specialized 
equipment such as dock landing and hospital ships (Greenfield & Ingram 2011; 
Herbert, Wharton, & Prosser, 2012; Kaczur, Aurelio, & Joloya, 2012; Moffat, 2014; 
Roughhead, Morrison, Cullison, & Gannon, 2013; Ures, 2011).  
The USN has diverted ships from original missions 366 times for 
humanitarian assistance as opposed to 22 times for combat from the years 1979 to 
2000, according to the fact sheets of United States Agency for International 
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Development (USAID) and Center for Naval Analysis (U.S. Naval Academy, 2011). 
One of the important questions raised here and by others (Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, & 
Ingram, 2013; Roughhead et al., 2013) is whether the USN will be able to continue 
and sustain humanitarian operations in an environment of fiscal austerity and budget 
cuts. Given that the USN plays a critical role in disaster relief worldwide, it is 
important to understand the costs of providing response capability for two reasons. 
First, if for monetary reasons the USN decides to reduce its involvement, the 
research described in this report will be helpful in providing other national or 
international organizations some estimate of the costs to fill potential gaps in 
response capability. Second, though HADR missions have become a significant 
function of the USN, and there is plenty of evidence that proves the USN’s 
willingness to provide disaster relief, in a time of limited budgets and weak 
economies across the world, it is essential that the USN has a concrete 
understanding of the costs associated with specific capabilities over time as well as 
the cost of economically maintaining key capabilities. The elevation of HADR 
operations to a core U.S. national security priority mandates a better understanding 
of the costs and cost drivers of HADR operations. 
It is particularly prudent therefore to understand what has been spent on 
HADR operations in order to begin the dialogue of assessing the contribution to 
security. This is an even more important reason for the USN to understand its HADR 
costs. In this research, we study selected past disasters from the perspective of 
HADR operations. We provide an outline for future studies based on our expertise 
and existing literature. 
The Disasters and the Costs 
As the USN takes on a more deliberate role in formal HADR missions, the 
way in which it executes its operational responses will have significant impacts on 
budgets established for other defense and security activities. Because financial 
expenditures are the result of operational activities, the decisions regarding both the 
types of assets that will be employed and deployed during an HADR mission 
demand careful consideration by decision-makers at the planning and policy-making 
levels (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Herbert et al., 2012; Kaczur et al., 2012; Moffat, 
2014; Ures, 2011). This study summarizes the type of expenditures associated with 
a specific set of HADR operations. We organize data from recent studies that have 
addressed the financial implications of HADR operations (Apte, 2009; Apte, 2014; 
Apte & Yoho, 2011, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Apte et al., 2013; Greenfield & Ingram 
2011).  
Over the last five years, we have been involved in research and analysis of 
costs incurred by the USN to respond to natural disasters. Each of these projects 
utilized the HADR classification described by Apte (2009) based on speed of onset 
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and geographical dispersion. In this report we recap the work by Ures (2011), 
Herbert et al. (2012), and Moffat (2014).  
For the purpose of our report, we focus on the costs associated with HADR 
operations for the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the Haiti earthquake of 2010, and 
the Japan Tōhoku earthquake of 2011. We organize the work of the key research in 
the area by Ures (2011), Herbert et al. (2010), and Moffat (2014). Bringing together 
this research provides a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate of the costs 
necessary to sustain and carry forward to future disasters the level of effort provided 
by the USN during past HADR operations. Table 1 summarizes the key literature on 
USN HADR costs and the cases studied in the key literature, respectively. 
Table 1. Cases Considered in the Key Literature for USN HADR Costs 
Reference Disaster studied Costs described Conclusion 
Ures (2011) 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 
2010 Haiti earthquake, and 
2010 Pakistan floods 
Estimated costs 
and reported 
costs 
Identified flight 
operations as best and 
cost-effective and cost-
effective capability 
Herbert et 
al. (2012) 
2011 Tōhoku earthquake in 
Japan 
Costs of specific 
asset types 
Identified flight 
operations as most 
expensive 
Moffat 
(2014) 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 
2010 Haiti earthquake, and 
2011 Tōhoku earthquake and 
tsunami in Japan 
Capability costs Identified vessels that 
are capable and cost 
effective 
The engagements of organizations that provide humanitarian assistance have 
significantly increased. Only a small portion of the defense budget goes towards the 
incremental costs of humanitarian operations. However, many costs get submerged, 
and hence, these costs are not transparent to the Congress of the United States 
(Factor, 2011). Figure 1 describes the cash flow process of the DoD. 
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Figure 1. Cash Flow Process of DoD for Humanitarian Operations  
(Ures, 2011) 
We selected the disasters because of their littoral location in addition to 
differences in their characteristics (Apte, 2009). The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was 
a sudden disaster and dispersed since it affected many countries. The 2010 Haiti 
earthquake was also sudden but localized. The 2011 Japan earthquake was also 
sudden but morphed into a crisis. Table 2 summarizes the devastation due to these 
disasters in terms of deaths, injured, missing, and displaced.  
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Table 2. Summary of the Three Disasters 
 
 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
On December 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake of 9.1 magnitude 
earthquake struck off the west coast of the island of Sumatra in Indonesia. Seven 
days after the earthquake, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) was 
diverted from conducting a port visit in Hong Kong to the coast of northern Sumatra. 
The carrier had 17 embarked helicopters (Elleman, 2007). The amphibious ship USS 
Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Group and 25 
helicopters, arrived five days later. The engagement of the DoD included 25 Navy 
 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 2010 Haiti Earthquake 2011 Japan Earthquake/Tsunami
Deaths >227,000 92,000-220,000 estimated >14,898
Injured >500,000 >250,000 >5,270
Missing
>2,000,000 (summary of initial 
reports)
>20,000 >10,000
Displaced >1,500,000 >1,100,000 >300,000
1. In Indonesia, more than 25% of 
Aceh Province's villages were 
destroyed
1. Destruction of all five 
medical facilities around 
Port-au-Prince
1. Meltdown of Fukushima nuclear 
power plant
2. Land transportation infrastructure 
was almost totally destroyed on 
many islands throughout the Indian 
Ocean
2. Destruction of Toussaint 
L'Ouverture International 
Airport
2. Sendai Airport, Uranohama and 
Kesenumma-Oshima Seaports 
overwhelemed with debris
3. Indonesia's Aceh Province lost 
almost all elements of local 
communications infrastructure
3. Considerable damage to 
communication 
infrastructure
3. Widescale power outages and 
destruction of hard line communications
3. Many islands lost all electric-
power production capability
4. Major damage to 
roadways by debris
4. Majority of small structures, 
personal property and lines of 
transportation affected area destroyed
3. US pledged more than one third 
of a billion dollars to repair and 
replace roads and fresh water 
distribution systems alone
5. Major damages to the 
Port-au-Prince seaport, 
rendering it unusable for 
immediate rescue 
operations
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 6 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
ships, one Coast Guard cutter, 82 planes, 51 helicopters, and 15,000 personnel 
(Elleman, 2007). The naval vessels operated as a sea base for relief efforts for 40 
days. They left the affected region only to be followed by the hospital ship USNS 
Mercy (T-AH 19) and supported by helicopters from USS Essex (LHD 2). Mercy 
Figure 2) provided sea-based hospital services for 34 days.  
 
 
Figure 2. The USNS Mercy and USS Abraham Lincoln Arrive on Station 
Near Banda Aceh, Sumatra, in 2004  
(U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 3rd Class Gabriel R. Piper) 
 
The incremental costs submitted by the USN are presented in Table 3. No 
active duty personnel costs were included in the cost submission presumably 
because the Navy considered the personnel costs as “sunk” and not part of the 
variable or incremental costs of the operation; personnel would be working on the 
ship whether they were responding to a disaster or not. The only personnel costs 
included were those for reserve or temporary duty personnel called up to support the 
HADR operation. The data for these costs are given in Table 3. For each vessel 
(name in the first column and platform in the second column) the table describes 
annual fuel and operating costs as well as daily fuel and operating costs. We 
summarize these in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Cost for Ships and Their Platforms for the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 
 
 
PLATFORMEnroute Days Days O/S
Annual Fuel 
Costs* 
Annual 
Operating 
Costs
Daily Fuel 
Costs
Daily 
Operating 
Costs
SHILOH CG 8 32 28,020,983 69,734,655 76,770 191,054
BUNKER HILL CG 4 20 12,603,547 67,858,359 34,530 185,913
ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 8 32 0 290,674,704 0 796,369
BENFOLD DDG 8 32 24,086,415 60,726,274 65,990 166,373
SHOUP DDG IIA 8 32 24,360,927 57,176,568 66,742 156,648
MILIUS DDG 4 20 13,591,382 60,109,785 37,237 164,684
THACH FFG 4 20 6,957,373 37,994,241 19,061 104,094
SWIFT HSV 27 33 5,123,411 11,692,310 14,037 32,034
WESTPAC EXPRESS HSV 5 36 8,183,415 21,876,449 22,420 59,935
BONHOMME RICHARD LHD 4 23 35,926,109 209,878,152 98,428 575,009
ESSEX LHD 5 17 31,970,153 186,983,673 87,589 512,284
DULUTH LPD 4 23 11,895,428 44,069,970 32,590 120,740
RUSHMORE LSD 4 23 10,724,924 70,395,426 29,383 192,864
FORT MCHENRY LSD 3 23 10,107,608 46,137,601 27,692 126,404
LOUISVILLE SSN 8 0 4,427 25,015,918 12 68,537
PASADENA SSN 4 0 12,135 28,987,911 33 79,419
SAN JOSE T-AFS 3 53 19,243,024 56,853,590 52,721 155,763
CONCORD T-AFS 3 20 11,809,392 50,067,891 32,354 137,172
NIAGARA FALLS T-AFS 3 13 14,251,408 63,596,616 39,045 174,237
JOHN MCDONNELL T-AGS 9 16 1,433,731 12,209,381 3,928 33,450
MERCY T-AH 18 47 12,688,238 59,363,088 34,762 162,639
1ST LT JACK LUMMUS T-AK 4 19 6,382,660 48,011,957 17,487 131,540
MAJ. STEPHEN W. PLESST-AK 2 19 18,817,120 56,256,994 51,554 154,129
CPL. LOUIS J. HAUGE JR T-AK 4 12 8,287,218 47,929,956 22,705 131,315
PFC. JAMES ANDERSON T-AK 2 11 7,126,549 44,371,080 19,525 121,565
1ST LT. HARRY L. MARTT-AK 0 13 6,464,093 36,055,194 17,710 98,781
1ST LT ALEX BONNYMANT-AK 4 18 8,470,399 48,113,801 23,207 131,819
TIPPECANOE T-AO 0 26 13,801,293 41,628,842 37,812 114,052
RAINER T-AOE 8 32 25,066,234 72,986,245 68,675 199,962
* all costs in FY2015 US$
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Table 4. USN-Reported Incremental Costs Associated With the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami Operations off the Coast of Sumatra 
USN Reported Incremental Costs (in thousands of 2015 dollars) 
Travel costs (to move people into and within the region) $252 
Reserve and Temporary Duty Personnel Support Costs $1,745 
Humanitarian Relief (infrastructure support & supplies) $818 
Operating Support (includes ship steaming days and flying hours) $66,384 
Total Reported Costs $69,198 
 
2010 Haiti Earthquake 
In January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck southern Haiti from an 
epicenter 10 miles southwest of the capital city, Port-au-Prince. Within days of the 
earthquake, the USN provided 20 ships including one aircraft carrier, one hospital 
ship, and seven amphibious ships. The relief was provided by Marine Corps and 
various units for construction engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, mobile 
diving and salvage, underwater construction, medical, civil affairs, and others. The 
engagement from ship- and land-based aircraft was equally massive. Surveillance 
aircraft surveyed the damage caused by the earthquake. Fixed-wing planes helped 
with delivery of cargo to satisfy the demand and assisted in evacuations. Helicopters 
provided the vertical lift capacity critical to operating in an area without functioning 
infrastructure. The USN and U.S. Marine Corps committed a total of 14 fixed-wing 
aircraft and 63 helicopters. 
The aid provided by the United States government in fiscal year (FY) 2010 
totaled $1.12 billion (Ures, 2011). Over $453.5 million of the total funding 
represented the incremental cost to the DoD. Approximately $151 million in 
incremental costs (or $168 million in 2015 dollars) were submitted by the Navy for 
reimbursement. The data for these costs are given in Table 5. For each vessel 
(name in the first column and platform in the second column) the table describes 
annual fuel and operating costs as well as daily fuel and operating costs. We 
summarize these in Table 6. 
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Table 5. Cost for Ships and Their Platforms for 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
 
Table 6. USN-Reported Incremental Costs Associated With the 2010 Haiti 
Earthquake Operations 
USN Reported Incremental Costs (in thousands of 2015 dollars) 
Travel costs (to move people into and within the region) $1,622 
Active Personnel Costs $37,650 
Reserve and Temporary Duty Personnel Support Costs $7,006 
Humanitarian Relief (infrastructure support & supplies) $19,931 
Operating Support (includes ship steaming days and flying hours) $102,118 
Total Reported Costs $168,327 
2011 Tōhoku Earthquake in Japan 
In March 2011, the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami triggered overwhelming 
destruction and loss that resulted in an immediate global impact. The Tōhoku 
 
Platform Days Enroute Days O/S 
Annual Fuel 
Costs*
Annual 
Operating 
Costs
Daily Fuel 
Costs
Daily 
Operating 
Costs
NORMANDY CG 5 18 18,472,617 65,713,974 50,610 180,038
BUNKER HILL CG 0 15 12,839,640 53,594,779 35,177 146,835
CARL VINSON CVN 2 17 0 380,653,676 0 1,042,887
HIGGINS DDG 2 12 7,634,307 54,045,513 20,916 148,070
HUAKAI HSV 4 27 8,980,487 37,138,529 24,604 101,749
UNDERWOOD FFG 1 20 7,087,674 31,243,662 19,418 85,599
NASSAU LHA 5 17 41,041,984 149,344,468 112,444 409,163
BATAAN LHD 4 65 26,634,038 159,775,128 72,970 437,740
KEARSARGE LHD 1 0 22,877,905 177,470,565 62,679 486,221
MESA VERDE LPD 5 17 13,653,604 56,231,411 37,407 154,059
FORT McHENRY LSD 4 51 3,024,109 175,472,604 8,285 480,747
CARTER HALL LSD 3 42 10,809,590 61,707,000 29,615 169,060
GUNSTON HALL LSD 3 24 7,697,420 57,324,994 21,089 157,055
ASHLAND LSD 5 17 12,410,197 71,413,530 34,001 195,654
CORNHUSKER STATE T-ACS 10 42 946,486 3,139,111 2,593 8,600
GOPHER STATE T-ACS 3 9 622,292 1,894,725 1,705 5,191
HENSON T-AGS 0 11 4,130,014 16,624,883 11,315 45,548
COMFORT T-AH 7 49 4,490,374 36,791,862 12,302 100,800
1ST LT JACK LUMMUS T-AK 6 15 8,785,619 42,392,055 24,070 116,143
PFC DEWAYNE T. WILLIAMS T-AK 4 28 5,080,970 28,210,371 13,920 77,289
SACAGAWEA T-AKE 14 14 13,267,952 61,444,074 36,351 168,340
LEWIS AND CLARK T-AKE 6 18 12,461,942 59,827,892 34,142 163,912
CAPE MAY T-AKR 4 44 2,361,313 5,907,342 6,469 16,184
BIG HORN T-AO 5 20 8,499,238 45,025,314 23,286 123,357
LEROY GRUMMAN T-AO 11 4 7,954,483 41,377,929 21,793 113,364
GRASP T-ARS 5 61 1,472,911 17,696,781 4,035 48,484
CARIBE PIONEER/FOSS 343 TUG 1 22 59,774 693,549 164 1,900
ELSBETH II/BB-110 TUG 1 38 170,023 1,567,758 466 4,295
ALLIE B/MEMPHIS BRIDGE TUG 0 15 188,192 778,381 516 2,133
McALLISTER BOYS/ATLANTIC TRADER TUG 7 15 126,261 1,091,562 346 2,991
* all costs in FY2015 US$
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earthquake resulted in over $200 billion in economic damage. The USN has 
approximately 70 ships, 300 various types of aircraft, and approximately 40,000 
sailors and Marines operating in the region on any given day, providing a ready and 
capable presence. Sixteen U.S. naval ships and eight military sealift ships provided 
disaster relief in and around the affected coastal areas of Japan. Military sealift ships 
were engaged in relief supply transfer to responding U.S. naval ships. U.S. naval 
ships engaged in operations such as search and rescue, relief supply delivery on 
shore, and aircraft refueling operations. All services from the DoD assisted with 
medical supplies and services, communications, relief supply, and civil engineering. 
The United States Pacific Command estimated total costs incurred from 
March 12, 2011, through June 30, 2011, to be approximately $2.89 billion in 2015 
dollars (see Table 8). These costs included the cost of moving personnel (including 
DoD civilians) into and within the region ($8.7 million); reserve and temporary duty 
personnel support costs for those called up specifically for the disaster response 
($334.9 million); humanitarian relief support, which included specific infrastructure 
and supply costs ($297.4 million); and operating support costs, which included ship 
steaming days and flying hour costs, and which make up the largest part of the total 
costs (approximately $2.25 billion). The data for these costs are given in Table 7. 
For each vessel (name in the first column and platform in the second column), the 
table describes annual fuel and operating costs as well as daily fuel and operating 
costs. We summarize these in Table 8. 
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Table 7. Cost for Ships and Their Platforms for 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake 
and Tsunami in Japan 
 
Table 8. USN-Reported Incremental Costs Associated With the 2011 
Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan 
USN Reported Incremental Costs (in thousands of 2015 dollars) 
Travel costs (to move people into and within the region) $8,712 
Reserve and Temporary Duty Personnel Support Costs $334,950 
Humanitarian Relief (infrastructure support & supplies) $297,403 
Operating Support (includes ship steaming days and flying hours) $2,254,649 
Total Reported Costs $2,895,714 
  
Platform Days Enroute Days O/S
Annual Fuel 
Costs*
Total 
Annual 
Cost
Daily Fuel 
Cost
Daily 
Operating 
Cost
CHANCELLORSVILLECG 1 22 27,309,174 69,690,477 74,820 190,933
COWPENS CG 2 21 17,938,439 71,164,853 49,146 194,972
SHILOH CG 2 21 4,898,678 72,823,479 13,421 199,516
RONALD REAGAN CVN 1 22 0 346,279,612 0 948,711
GEORGE WASHINGTOCVN 0 0 0 439,467,488 0 1,204,021
PREBLE DDG IIA 1 22 17,624,283 80,226,310 48,286 219,798
MUSTIN DDG IIA 2 21 16,392,195 55,375,623 44,910 151,714
MCCAMBLE DDG IIA 0 24 15,533,788 65,499,045 42,558 179,449
JOHN MCCAIN DDG 1 22 11,025,298 50,546,145 30,206 138,483
CURTIS WILBUR DDG 1 23 11,485,218 49,455,930 31,466 135,496
FITZGERALD DDG 1 22 16,246,998 63,810,109 44,512 174,822
ESSEX LHD 6 22 24,853,098 151,471,561 68,091 414,991
GERMANTOWN LSD 6 22 7,873,809 46,270,809 21,572 126,769
HARPERS FERRY LSD 6 22 2,361,519 152,970,226 6,470 419,097
TORTUGA LSD 3 25 5,698,340 51,348,731 15,612 140,681
BLUE RIDGE LCC 7 22 12,320,072 98,492,118 33,754 269,841
RICHARD E BYRD T-AKE 0 6 17,329,636 51,350,236 47,478 140,686
CARL BRASHEAR T-AKE 1 14 14,635,129 52,597,508 40,096 144,103
MATTHEW PERRY T-AKE 3 20 13,309,080 45,177,029 36,463 123,773
PECOS T-AO 0 17 3,626,625 33,412,203 9,936 91,540
RAPPAHANNOACK T-AO 0 23 8,059,244 37,353,476 22,080 102,338
BRIDGE T-AOE 1 22 21,661,876 63,547,769 59,348 174,103
SAFEGUARD T-ARS 10 15 1,848,331 14,959,099 5,064 40,984
WESTPAC EXPRESS HSV 1 7 10,002,451 22,087,524 27,404 60,514
* all costs in FY2015 US$
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Summary and Future Research 
Particularly in these times of budget cuts, realignment of forces, and 
restructuring of the Services, it is essential to study HADR operations—one of the 
USN’s core capabilities—for at least two reasons: (1) to understand how the cost 
impacts of these “other than war” missions affect the DoD budget, and (2) a rough of 
order of magnitude (RoM) of the costs will benefit other organizations involved in 
humanitarian operations in case the USN decides to significantly curtail its HADR 
missions. We summarized the data from selected past disasters to organize their 
costs to propose future studies that can provide operational and financial policy 
recommendations that will induce efficiency and effectiveness. 
Our report organizes the data from the available studies for 2004 Indian 
Tsunami, 2010 Haiti earthquake, and Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011 in 
Japan and provides a synopsis of each of these disasters which identifies the 
specific characteristics of the disaster, as well as the response time and USN assets 
used during the response.  
There have been several important and useful studies of disaster responses. 
However, not many have examined and inventoried the specific relief provided, and 
even fewer that we are aware of have examined the costs. We recommend a future 
study that, in addition to summarizing the key cost analysis and cost estimation work 
of USN HADR operations, will also research which particular operations are the 
drivers of these costs. This analysis is not only of benefit to the USN but also other 
national military organizations and humanitarian organizations for the reasons stated 
earlier.  
Future studies could include further exploration of avenues for collecting data 
from other sources that may have financial or operational information regarding the 
USN responses. Such research will help explain the primary drivers (cost elements) 
of the total costs associated with the USN responses. A study that digs deeper to 
uncover the costliest USN operations could reveal the cost drivers of HADR 
missions as well as which assets of the USN are used for such operations. Such 
assets are of importance to HADR operations. The study would help the USN make 
decisions regarding the acquisition of these assets or, in the case of assets that 
have been mothballed, the USN might determine to bring them back to functionality. 
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